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JUDICIAL IMMUNITY-INJUNCTIVE RELIEF-ALTHOUGH JUDGES AND
QUASI-JUDICIAL OFFICERS ARE IMMUNE FROM ACTION FOR DAMAGES
UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES FOR ACTS ACCOMPLISHED IN THE
DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES, WHEN A CLASS DISCRIMINATION

IS ALLEGED, BOTH JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL OFFICERS MAY BE
MANDATORILY ENJOINED FROM FURTHER INFRINGEMENT UPON THE
RIGHTS OF THE COMPLAINING CLASS. Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d

389 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3432 (U.S. Jan. 3, 1973)
(No. 72-953).

Plaintiffs, black citizens of Cairo,
name of themselves and all other
on the basis of race and poverty.
propriate sections of the 1871 Civil

Illinois, initiated this class action in the
persons similarly discriminated against
The action was brought under the apRights Act' and sought injunctive relief

against the defendant county officials who allegedly systematically applied
Illinois' criminal laws so as to discriminate against the plaintiffs. Named as
defendants in the complaint were two Alexander County judges, the state's
attorney, and an investigator for the state's attorney (although the investigator was not an assistant state's attorney). 2 Plaintiffs' original complaint
was brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois, but was dismissed for want of jurisdiction by reason of the doctrine of
judicial immunity. In the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, appellants
alleged discrimination in the application of criminal laws which thereby
Benevolent Ass'n, 111 Tex. 191, 230 S.W. 978 (1921) (exemption denied due to the
fact that the use of the property for other than charitable purposes rendered such
use only partly charitable; the other than charitable use was to pursue the work of the
Masonic order); Morris v. Lone Star Chapter No. 6, 68 Tex. 698, 5 S.W. 519 (1887)
(exemption denied because two floors of the lodge were rented to others, even though
the proceeds were devoted to charity); Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, Lodge
No. 151 v. City of Houston, 44 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1931, writ
ref'd) (use of lodge was not exclusively for charitable purposes); Masonic Temple
Ass'n v. Amarillo Ind. School Dist., 14 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1928,
writ ref'd) (lodge was used for social activities by lodge members, and this was held to
be only partly charitable).
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (1970); originally the measure which became
§ 1983 was the Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13; § 1981 was the Act of
May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144; and § 1985 was the Act of April 20, 1871,
ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13.
2. Specifically defendants were claimed to have denied black citizens the right to
give evidence of criminal conduct committed by whites upon blacks. The state's
attorney refused to initiate criminal proceedings against whites when complaints were
received by his office from blacks, and even when such complaints were acted upon,
the state's attorney engaged in the practice of inadequate prosecution so as to deny
complainants an adequate remedy. Defendant judges were charged with engaging in
discriminatory practices based upon race by setting higher bond for blacks in criminal
cases and by sentencing blacks to longer prison terms, under harsher conditions, than
those accorded to whites.
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interfered with their constitutional rights. Held-Reversed and remanded.
Although judges and quasi-judicial officers are immune from action for damages under the civil rights statutes for acts accomplished in the discharge
of their official duties; when a class discrimination is alleged, both judicial
and quasi-judicial officers may be enjoined from further infringement upon
the rights of the complaining class.
The doctrine of judicial immunity has long been established as a defense to civil action for members of the judiciary.8 It is a doctrine which
had its inception in the common law. 4 In Yates v. Lansing,5 the court traced
the development of the doctrine as far back as Edward III. In discussing the
immunity doctrine the court stated, "It is to be found in the earliest judicial
record, and it has been steadily maintained by an undisturbed current of
decisions in the English courts, amidst every change of policy, and through
every revolution of their government."
The doctine of judicial immunity from civil action progressed along
similar lines in the United States. As many as nine reasons have been suggested by one legal scholar as the basis for the adoption of such a sweeping doctrine of immunity.7 His reasoning suggests that without the application of the doctrine, men of property and responsibility would tend to decline service in the judiciary. It is further argued that tahe threat of litigation for every judicial action would destroy the independence of the judici8
ary.
One of the landmark cases dealing with the doctrine and the extent of its
effect was Bradley v. Fisher.9 There an attorney filed suit for damages
against a judge who had denied him the right to continue practicing law
within the court's jurisdiction. The Court held that judges are immune from
civil actions for their judicial functions, even when such functions are in
excess of designated jurisdictions, or are performed maliciously and corruptly. 10 This case established the rule that liability for damages will lie
3. Harvey v. Sadler, 331 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1964); Spruill v. O'Toole, 74 F.2d
559 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Fawcett v. Dole, 29 A. 693 (N.H. 1892).
4. Allen v. Biggs, 62 F. Supp. 229, 230 (E.D. Pa. 1945); United States v. Chaplin,
54 F. Supp. 926, 933-34 (S.D. Cal. 1944).
5. 5 Johns. 1020, 1022-23 (Sup. Ct. 1810).
6. Id. at 1023.
7. Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MmNN. L. REv. 263, 27172 (1937).
8. Jennings further suggests that the judiciary owes its sole duty to the public
collectively; that the doctrine results in the saving of judicial time; that absolute
finality in litigation of controversies exists because of the doctrine; and, that it would
be grossly unfair to require a judge to give his opinion and then penalize him for the
expression of that opinion.
9. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1872).
10. Id. at 354, 20 L. Ed. at 651. The Court in its holding distinguished between
those acts in excess of jurisdiction and those where there was a clear and complete
absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter. It was found that in the former
instance judicial immunity would apply, whereas in the latter it would not.
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against judicial officers only when the action taken is outside the limits of
his jurisdiction."
Under the common law, the doctrine of judicial immunity had expanded
to include quasi-judicial officers. 12 In an action against a special assistant
to the attorney general, one court included within the scope of judicial immunity, quasi-judicial officers acting in the exercise of their duties. 13 However, it has been held that when such an officer acts in some capacity other
than his quasi-judicial role, the immunity doctrine does not apply. 4
Although the immunity of judicial and quasi-judicial officers applied
without challenge under the common law, the civil rights statutes provided
an area wherein the application of the doctrine was questioned. Upon conclusion of the Civil War, it became apparent that many white, local officials in southern states were utilizing their positions to deny blacks and
their sympathizers an equal access to the courts, their remedies, and the
freedom granted under the thirteenth amendment. 15 The Congress, through
legislation, sought to curtail such exclusions by eliminating both state laws
and private conduct which indulged in racial discrimination. In 1866 two
acts were passed, over President Andrew Johnson's veto, which provided for
criminal sanctions against "any person" who, under color of law subjected
another to the deprivation of any right.'
The intent of Congress in the area
of criminal liability was clear. Judicial immunity had been eliminated as
17
a defense under the acts.
The Congress likewise sought to provide civil remedies for racially discriminatory acts by enacting the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.'8 The key to
the act was section 2 which provided that "every person" who caused another to be subject to the deprivation of his rights would be liable, either in
11. Id. at 352, 20 L. Ed. at 651.
12. Booth v. Fletcher, 101 F.2d 676, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
13. Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 404 (2d Cir.), a! 'd, 275 U.S. 503, 48 S. Ct. 155,
72 L. Ed. 395 (1927) (per curiam). The court found that a United States attorney, if
not a judicial officer, was at least a quasi-judicial officer with immunity extending to
duties necessary in their role as public prosecutors.
14. Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1965). The court reversed the lower court's holding and found that the county attorney had directed
certain police activity in such a manner so as to coerce and intimidate the appellant
into making a confession. Id. at 537. Basically the rule as expressed in Fletcher v.
Wheat, 100 F.2d 432, 434 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 621 (1939), has been
that neither judges nor quasi-judicial officers are subject to harassment by retaliatory
actions for injuries alleged to have resulted from the performance of official duties.
15. Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 396 (7th Cir. 1972).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970) became the crucial section of the act; for the reasoning of President Johnson's veto pertaining to the independence of the judiciary. See
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475-76 (1866).
17. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1835 (1866), wherein the remarks of
Congressman Lawrence indicated the attitude of the Congress concerning criminal
liability for judicial officers under the act.
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1970).
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law or equity, to the party so injured. 19 Although these civil statutes were
similar in tone and intent to the criminal provisions, there was neither an
express nor implied indication as to whether "every person" included judi20
cial officers.
Although numerous courts had determined that civil rights violations by
judicial and quasi-judicial officers could not be prosecuted due to judicial
immunity, 21 the issue had not been finally and judicially determined until
the Supreme Court ruled in the case of Pierson v. Ray. 22 In Pierson a state
court judge was sued for damages for his adjudging certain clergymen,
demonstrating on behalf of civil rights, guilty of violating "whites only" restrictions in waiting areas and lunchcounters. The court recounted the doctrine of judicial immunity and stressed its role as the guardian of an independent judiciary. A thorough investigation of the relevant statutes uncovered no specific congressional intent to eliminate the doctrine. 23 It was
held that the civil rights statutes did not abolish the immunity of judges for
acts accomplished within their judicial role and therefore a state judge could
not be found liable for damages for his unconstitutional convictions. 24 Pier19. Id. § 1983. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.-The precise statement of the section.
20. In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377, 71 S. Ct. 783, 788, 95 L. Ed. 1019,
1027 (1951), the Court found that "every person" did not include legislators. In
that case a California legislator was sued for statements made while acting as a committee chairman. The Court ruled that Congress could not have intended to eliminate
legislative immunity. Id. at 376, 71 S. Ct. at 788, 95 L. Ed. at 1023. The holding in
Tenney was the basis upon which Picking v. Pa. R.R., 151 F.2d 240, 250 (3d Cir.
1945), was overruled. The Picking case was one of the few cases to have held a judicial officer liable for damages, but such a holding lasted only until Bauers v. Heisel,
361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967), where the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit sitting en banc overruled Picking.
21. See Peckham v. Scanlon, 241 F.2d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 1957); Mackey v. Nesbett, 285 F. Supp. 498, 502 (D. Alas. 1968); Garfield v. Palmieri, 193 F. Supp. 582,
585 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
22. 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967).
23. Id. at 554, 87 S. Ct. at 1218, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 295.
24. Id. at 554, 87 S. Ct. at 1218, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 294. A recent case indicative
of the vast extent of the doctrine with regard to damages is that of McAlester v.
Brown, 469 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1972). In this case, appellants, who were the elderly
parents of a son scheduled to stand trial on criminal charges, went to the Grayson
County, Texas Courthouse with the intention of providing fresh clothing for their son
to wear in court. While in the courthouse appellants inquired in the office of the
district judge the time for commencement of the trial. When the judge learned of the
reason for their presence, he lost his temper and ordered appellants out of his office and
threatened to have the couple thrown in jail. Because of their age and the confusion
resulting from the attitude of the judge, the couple did not move quickly enough for
the judge who left to find a deputy sheriff. The judge returning with a deputy apprehended the couple in the corridor and ordered the deputy to arrest Mr. McAlester
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son thus settled the issue of judicial immunity with regard to damages;
however, no mention was made in the decision concerning injunctive re2
lief and its relationship to the doctrine.
The present case, Littleton v. Berbling,26 addressed itself directly to the
question of judicial immunity from injunctive relief under the civil rights
statutes. The court admitted that the issue had only been considered by
a few lower courts, but that all the cases directly involved alleged discriminations against a cognizable class by a judicial officer. After examining
the history of the doctrine, as well as the progression of cases leading to
Pierson, the court found no dispute with the decision there. It relied, however, upon an interpretation by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
which held that Pierson did not indicate that judges could not be enjoined
from pursuing a course of unlawful conduct. 27
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit mentioned two cases from
the district courts of the Fifth Circuit which upheld the rationale of the Littleton decision. 28 In seeking a unity among these few prior decisions available,
and place him in jail. The appellant was incarcerated for the remainder of the day and
was later found by the judge to be in contempt of court. In an action for damages
brought by the McAlesters against the judge, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of the action based upon the doctrine of judicial immunity
from actions for damages. The court pointed out that immunity applies even where
there is malice. Id. at 1282. The court also found the judge to be acting within his
judicial jurisdiction since the act occurred within his chambers, the controversy arose
from a case pending before the judge, and the confrontation arose directly out of a
visit to the judge in his official capacity. Id. at 1282.
25. In dissenting, Justice Douglas argued that generally, "'every person' would
mean every person, not every person except judges." Id. at 559, 87 S. Ct. at 1220,
18 L. Ed. 2d at 297 (emphasis by J. Douglas).
26. 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972).
27. United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 738 n.3 (5th Cir. 1967) (citations
omitted), which stated, "In Pierson v. Ray, the Supreme Court held that judges are immune from liability for damages in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case does not,
of course, mean that they may not be enjoined from pursuing a course of unlawful
conduct." Accord, United States v. Clark, 249 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ala. 1965), where a
three-judge federal court was faced with a similar complaint of judicial discrimination
concerning voter registration. Injunctive relief was sought and granted with the court
holding that the judicial immunity doctrine had no application where the relief sought is
preventive. Id. at 727.
28. Phillips v. Cole, 298 F. Supp. 1049, 1051 (N.D. Miss. 1968), where a suit was
brought by black indigent juveniles seeking enjoinment of state prosecution from
charges of delinquency, the court found that federal injunctive relief may be utilized
over state law in those cases where it is the only means for avoiding grave and irreparable injury upon constitutional rights. In Bramlett v. Peterson, 307 F. Supp.
1311 (M.D. Fla. 1969), the court considered a suit in behalf of all indigent persons
denied certain constitutional rights because of their impoverished condition, specifically rights arising under the sixth amendment. The court in granting the relief held
that judicial immunity does not apply to suits for injunctive and protective relief. The
court therefore enjoined the defendants from failure to effectuate the sixth amendment's right to counsel guaranteed to plaintiffs and members of their class, through the
adoption of adequate procedures to assure indigents the availability of counsel in misdemeanor cases. Id. at 1322.
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the court stated: "In sum, those courts which have considered the issue
have held that when a class-discrimination is alleged, judicial officers may
'29
be enjoined.
With regard to the question of quasi-judicial immunity, the court concluded that a similar holding was in order. The court agreed that under
Pierson a quasi-judicial officer is immune from suits for damages under the
civil rights acts. The point was expressed that in order for such officers to
come under the immunity doctrine, their actions had to come within the
scope of their prosecutorial discretion. The conclusion was enunciated that
even though the immunity doctrine remained for suits for damages, the doctrine did not extend to protect quasi-judicial officers, or judges, from freedom from injunctive relief.8 0
In his dissent, Judge Dillin expressed the belief that the court had mistakenly extended to a federal district court the power to supervise and regulate, through mandatory injunction, the discretion of state court judges. He
argued that no such power existed, and the majority's holding would upset
the relationship between the state and federal judiciary with the federal
courts acting as watchdogs for violations of judicial discretion in the state
courts.'31

Judge Dimin agreed with the majority that the immunity doctrine does not
preclude the granting of equitable, injunctive relief against members of the
judiciary. However, he drew a distinction between those cases cited in the
majority opinion and the present case, in that the former cases dealt with
prohibitory injunctions, whereas here the concern was with a mandatory injunction. The judge stated: "There is a great difference between ordering
an official not to do a particular act, measurable by objective standards, and
in ordering him to exercise his discretion in a certain general way, measur8' 2
able only by subjective standards.
In his final point of dissent, it was proposed that the doctrine which
protects the judiciary from damage suits equally applies to mandatory injunctions which attempt to regulate the exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial discretion. In defending such a relationship between actions for damages and mandatory injunctions, Judge Dillin concluded, "It would be cold
comfort for such an official to be told by this Court: 'Be of good cheer! We
will protect your pocketbook, even as we send you to jail.' "833
The dissent regards the distinction between a mandatory injunction and a
prohibitory injunction as crucial to the result of the case. Despite his concessions that the immunity doctrine does not preclude equitable relief, Judge
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 408 (7th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 414.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 419.
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Dillin argues that the court has no power to supervise and regulate the discretion of state judicial officers, through mandatory injunctions. The distinction between the two forms of equitable remedies is not as crucial as asserted. The general intention of any form of injunctive relief is to require
the one to whom it is directed to do or to refrain from doing a particular
act. 34 Although the mandatory injunction appears to be the more severe
since it may order certain action to be initiated, its intent is identical with that
of a preventive injunction-to assure equitable and just relief for the aggrieved party.3 5 The dissent, in suggesting such a distinction, would sustain
complaints of discrimination when the acts were committed upon the complaining party; however, complaints would be dismissed when the acts alleged, as here, resulted from a failure to use one's judicial or quasi-judicial
discretion to the detriment of the injured party.
The terminology utilized in defining the injunction is secondary in import. The intent of the relevant statute and the courts has been to eliminate
discriminatory practices, within the framework of the law. It is that factor
which should guide the courts in arriving at their decisions.
The majority holding has seemingly progressed to the next logical step in
the development of the doctrine of judicial immunity. It was a doctrine
which was initially accepted without question as providing immunity from
all civil actions. 36 There evolved the notion that such a doctrine was absolute
37
under the common law, but did not necessarily apply under statutory law.
It came to be adopted as a general rule that judicial immunity applied
only when the acts committed were within the judicial functions of the judiciary.38 The dispute then arose as to the distinction between damages
and injunctive relief with regard to the doctrine. Pierson v. Ray settled the
issue as to damages, but failed to resolve the issue as to injunctive relief.3 9
Littleton seeks to resolve the question. Although the precedent for its holding is not voluminous, due primarily to the infrequent use of such relief,
Littleton is sound and represents the weight of authority. 40
34. Gainsburg v. Dodge, 101 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Ark. 1937).
35. Bailey v. Schnitzius, 16 A. 680, 681 (N.J. Ct. App. 1889).
36. Francis v. Crafts, 203 F.2d 809, 811 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 835
(1953).
37. See generally Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 25 L. Ed. 676 (1879). It was
one of the first cases considering the doctrine under the civil rights statutes. There, a
Virginia county judge was indicted for denying blacks the opportunity to serve on
juries. Although the Court found that the action of jury selection was a ministerial
function rather than a judicial function coming under the protection of the doctrine,
the Supreme Court indicated that a judge could be held criminally liable for ministerial
actions, as well as actions outside the limits of judicial discretion. Id. at 348-49,
25 L. Ed. at 680.
38. Fletcher v. Wheat, 100 F.2d 432, 434 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 621
(1939).
39. 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 1217, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288, 295 (1967).
40. Jacobson v. Schaefer, 441 F.2d 127, 130 (7th Cir. 1971); accord, Palermo v.
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